Identifying disinformation: an ABC. IES Policy Brief Issue 2016/01 - February 2016 by Nimmo, Ben
æPolicy  brief
By Ben Nimmo
Definitions of disinformation 
Definitions of disinformation are widely available and largely 
agree on the essence. The Oxford English dictionary, for example, 
defines it as ‘False information which is intended to mislead, 
especially propaganda issued by a government organization 
to a rival power or the media’. Online encyclopaedia Wikipedia, 
based on the Merriam-Webster dictionary, defines it similarly, 
as ‘Intentionally false or inaccurate information that is spread 
deliberately. It is an act of deception and false statements to 
convince someone of untruth. Disinformation should not be 
confused with misinformation, information that is unintentionally 
false.’ A research paper in American Psychologist, meanwhile, 
defines disinformation as ‘information that is incorrect by intent’, 
contrasting it with misinformation, which is ‘information that is 
incorrect by accident’ (Lewandowsky et.al., 2013).
These definitions all agree that there are two key aspects of 
disinformation: 
• The falsehood of the information 
• The intention to mislead 
While defining disinformation is relatively easy, identifying it in 
One of the key challenges in countering information warfare is identifying when 
it is taking place. The concept of disinformation 
is widely understood and has been exhaustively 
defined; however, the currently available definitions 
do not allow for the operational identification of 
disinformation in a sufficiently rapid manner to 
allow for effective countermeasures. This paper 
argues that the essence of disinformation is the 
intent to deceive. While such an intent is difficult 
to prove, it can be inferred by reference to three key 
criteria, termed the “ABC approach”. These criteria 
are: the accuracy of factual statements, balance in 
reporting and the credibility of the sources chosen. 
This ABC approach is intended to give academics, 
analysts and policy-makers an operational method 
to determine whether disinformation has been 
committed in a given case. 
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practice is a more challenging problem. The truth or falsehood of 
the information given can generally be proven in time, through 
reference to sufficient evidence; this has especially become the 
case with the advent of social-media analysis, which has opened 
up new avenues of evidence and greatly enlarged the available 
palette of witnesses (Czuperski et al, 2015). While establishing 
that falsehood in an operationally significant timescale is 
challenging (Nimmo, 2015), the accuracy of the information can 
generally be identified. 
It is much harder to identify the intention to mislead, as this 
requires, at the extreme, an insight into the mental processes of 
an individual. Yet it is crucial to be able to distinguish between 
deliberate and accidental falsehood, because the deliberate 
spreading of false information is, in essence, an attack on the 
integrity of the institution concerned. Deliberately spreading lies 
about the performance of a publicly-listed company is an attack 
on that company and the integrity of the investment market; 
deliberately spreading lies about a person is an attack on that 
person; deliberately spreading lies in the course of a debate on 
government policy is an attack on the integrity of the democratic 
process. It is important for the integrity of those institutions to 
be able to identify the attacks and respond to the attackers. 
Across Europe, governments and international organisations are 
grappling with the question of how to identify and respond to 
disinformation. The European Union’s External Action Service has 
begun coordinating a network of journalists, non-governmental 
organisations, academics and officials aimed at identifying and 
analysing disinformation; the European Parliament’s research 
service has published a briefing note on Russian disinformation 
(Bentzen & Russell, 2015); the Latvian government has set up a 
NATO-accredited Centre of Excellence to analyse disinformation 
and broader questions of strategic communications. These and 
similar initiatives all bear witness to the seriousness with which 
the problem is viewed, and the difficulty of developing a working 
definition of disinformation. 
Disinformation is not the preserve of any one form of 
government. Democracies and autocracies alike can, and do, 
make use of the full range of weapons available to the state, 
including communications. However, democracies are subject to 
a range of checks and balances which are lacking in autocracies, 
and which make the spreading of disinformation more difficult. 
In democracies, independent and pluralist media, the scrutiny 
of political opponents, free and independent judiciaries and the 
activities of civil society all tend to set limits to the ability to 
deceive. Autocracies, which by their nature strive for control of 
their opponents, the media, the judiciary and civil society, can 
commit disinformation far more easily, and are much harder to 
challenge through the normal processes of the democratic state. 
Regardless of the identity of the person or organisation seeking 
to deceive, however, the key question is how to establish the 
intent to disinform, once false information has been identified. 
This paper argues that such deliberation can be inferred by 
examining the accuracy of the information given, the balance 
of commentators interviewed and the credibility of the sources 
chosen: the ABC of disinformation. 
Accuracy and the duty of care
The first duty of those who speak to the public from positions 
of authority, such as politicians, journalists and academics, is to 
make sure that they are getting their facts right. This is a duty of 
care, and it can be stated in the following terms: 
“Those who speak from a position of authority have the duty to 
ensure: 
1) that any statement of fact which they make has been 
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subjected to a reasonable degree of verification to ensure its 
accuracy; 
2) that their reporting ensures an appropriate balance in its use 
of commentators; 
3) that due care is taken to ensure the credibility of the sources 
quoted.
Those who fail to exhibit a reasonable degree of care in these 
areas are committing disinformation. “
A “reasonable degree” is, of necessity, a flexible term. For example, 
where a speaker is found to have given false information, a 
number of factors will play a role in determining whether there 
appears to have been an intent to mislead: 
• Could the speaker have found out the correct information 
easily? 
• Was the correct information readily available from multiple 
sources? 
• Did the speaker issue a correction? 
• Did the speaker qualify their statement at the time? (E.g. by 
the addition of qualifiers such as ‘apparently’ or ‘allegedly’.) 
Consider, for example, the statement made by New Jersey 
governor and Republican presidential hopeful Chris Christie 
on 16 December 2015, in an attack on U.S. President Barack 
Obama’s foreign-policy credentials, as reported by New Jersey 
website NJ.com: 
“This president’s not trusted ... but I’ll tell you this: When I stand 
across from King Hussein of Jordan, and I say to him, ‘You have a 
friend again, sir, who will stand with you to fight this fight,’ he’ll 
change his mind.”
This statement is factually inaccurate: King Hussein died in 1999. 
It is an error which is readily identifiable, with multiple online 
sources identifying the current monarch. However, Christie 
subsequently admitted in public that he ‘misspoke’, correcting 
his own error. As such, it is reasonable to suppose that his initial 
inaccuracy was not an act of deliberate falsehood, but a factual 
slip. 
Compare with this the statement made by the Secretary of the 
National Security Council of the Russian Federation, Nikolai 
Patrushev, to Elena Chernenko, security correspondent for the 
newspaper Kommersant, in an interview published on 22 June 
2015: 
“We all remember the phrase used by the Americans to describe 
Russia’s closest neighbours. They called them ‘front-line states’, 
unambiguously showing that the ‘front line’ goes along our state 
border. Against that background, it has been announced that 
the NATO command is planning to deploy a contingent of up to 
30,000 people here.” 
The number 30,000 is diagnostic. By quoting it, Patrushev was 
referring to a decision taken by NATO defence ministers in 
February 2015 - that is, some four months earlier - to increase 
the size of the NATO Response Force (NRF), a rapid-reaction corps 
created in 2002. The decision was announced by NATO Secretary 
General Jens Stoltenberg, who said in a press conference at the 
time, “Altogether, the enhanced NATO Response Force will count 
up to around 30,000 troops.” 
However, Patrushev’s comment contained a significant factual 
error: the NATO decision was not to “deploy a contingent of up 
to 30,000 people here”, to the Russian border. It was to increase 
the number of forces allocated to the NRF, while leaving the 
troops involved based in their own countries.
This is a point of fundamental importance. NATO does not have 
its own soldiers: individual member states provide (or sometimes 
fail to provide) the troops requested by NATO’s commanders. 
In the case of the NRF, members take it in turns to put rapid-
reaction units on standby, in case NATO needs them. Those units 
stay based in their home country, unless they are called out on 
exercise or to answer a crisis.
The NRF has operated in that way since it was created in 2002. 
Stoltenberg effectively confirmed that it would continue to do 
so at the same press conference, when he said that “The lead 
element of this land brigade will be ready to move within as little 
as 48 hours (...) Six Allies declared today that they are ready to 
act as framework nations for the new Spearhead Force. France, 
Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom have 
offered to take up this role, in rotation, in the coming years.”
In other words, Patrushev’s claim to Kommersant (subsequently 
amplified by other Russian-language outlets, including the state 
news agency, RIA Novosti) was false. NATO was not planning to 
move its troops to the Russian border: it was planning to put 
more troops on standby in their home countries. 
The question therefore arises whether this was an accident or a 
deliberate error. First of all, it is worth noting that Stoltenberg’s 
statement was not explicit on the issue of where the enhanced 
NRF would be based; it appears to have taken for granted 
that listeners would understand. Moreover, at the same press 
conference he spoke of setting up “multinational command and 
control units” on the territory of eastern allies. An uninformed 
and inattentive commentator could, therefore, have concluded 
that the NRF as a whole would be based in Eastern Europe. 
However, open-source material on the NRF is readily available, 
not least NATO’s own fact sheets and official statements. 
Furthermore, reporting from the February meeting, including by 
outlets such as Stars and Stripes (Lekic, 2015) and the Associated 
Press (Dahlburg, 2015), made clear that the enhanced NRF units 
would be based in their home countries - with Reuters even 
underlining that the decision “falls short of the hopes of some 
eastern European countries for NATO to set up large bases in the 
region” (Croft, 2015). 
In addition, Patrushev is not an uninformed commentator: he 
is the head of the Russian National Security Council, a post he 
has held since 2008, and prior to that he was the director of 
the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), the country’s premier 
intelligence-gathering organisation. Indeed, it could be argued 
that he is one of the best-informed officials on matters of 
national security in the Russian apparatus. Equally importantly, 
he was not speaking in the heat of the moment, but more than 
four months after Stoltenberg made his statement, and therefore 
had ample time to verify the state of the situation. 
It is legitimate to assume that, by nature of Patrushev’s 
background, his current role, the long existence of the NRF, and 
the importance of NATO in Russia’s national security, he both 
could and should have been aware of the true nature of the 
NRF enhancement by June 2015.  Yet he misstated the facts. He 
did so explicitly and definitely, without seeking to nuance the 
statement (“planning to deploy a contingent of up to 30,000 
people here”), and he never corrected his misstatement. His 
intentions in so doing cannot be proven, but it is clear that he 
failed in the basic duty of care.
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By the criteria outlined above, Patrushev committed an act of 
disinformation when he made his claim.    
Balance 
A further duty of care falls upon the media to ensure balance 
in their reporting. This is because a false impression of events 
can be conveyed, even without the dissemination of false 
information, if the reporting only reflects one side of a dispute. 
An example of this concerns a report published by the China 
People’s Daily on 1 February 2016. The report analysed the 
presence of a U.S. warship close to the South China Sea islands 
known in Chinese as the Xisha, and in English as the Paracels, 
with reference to four commentators - two experts and two 
officials. All four commentators accused the U.S. of violating 
Chinese territorial waters and stoking tensions in the region. The 
unnamed journalist opened their story with the statement that, 
“according to observers,” the U.S. move was an attempt to return 
tension to the region. 
In terms of pure fact, there is no indication that this report 
falsified any of the information presented. The story states 
prominently that it is reporting the opinions of observers, rather 
than the journalist’s own opinion; the observers are named and 
their positions identified; all four have expertise relevant to the 
story. 
However, two of the four “observers” are researchers at facilities 
subordinate to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) - 
respectively, the PLA Naval Military Studies Research Institute 
and the PLA National Defence University. The other two are 
officials from the Chinese foreign and defence ministries. All 
four are thus employees of the Chinese state and representatives 
of the state’s point of view. Since the American point of view 
was barely mentioned in the report, it clearly fails to ensure 
balance. 
The question then arises whether the reporter could have 
provided balancing quotes by making a reasonable effort. In this 
case, a Pentagon spokesman issued a statement on the incident, 
giving the U.S. justification. The U.S. stance on the South China 
Sea has been made publicly available in a variety of policy 
documents posted online. It would have taken no more than a 
swift Google search to provide a number of balancing quotes. 
Thus, the journalist and editorial team could, very easily, have 
found alternative sources to provide balance to their story. There 
is no indication that they made the effort to do so. As such, their 
report can be considered a piece of deliberate disinformation. 
Credibility 
A report can also be considered as spreading disinformation if it 
relies for part or whole of its effect on a commentator, or group 
of commentators, who cannot be considered as credible experts 
on the issue in question, when other, more credible experts could 
have been found easily. 
A striking example of this comes from Russian state-run TV station 
RT (formerly Russia Today). In a news report on the forthcoming 
Dutch referendum on the EU’s Association Agreement with 
Ukraine published on 9 January 2016, the channel quoted as 
its sole external analyst, “legal expert and international affairs 
editor for Russia Insider, Alexander Mercouris.” Mercouris was 
commenting on the political significance of the referendum: 
“My guess is that people in the Netherlands are opposed more to 
the EU expansion, which leads to more immigration into western 
Europe from eastern Europe. And they don’t want thousands 
upon thousands of people coming from Ukraine... One of the 
reasons why people in Ukraine have wanted it [the agreement], 
is precisely because that’s exactly what they want to do.” 
Mercouris is regularly cited in RT stories, usually providing 
comments on foreign affairs. The justification for invoking 
him is usually that he is “international affairs editor for Russia 
Insider”. However, on one occasion more in-depth identification 
was given: when the story concerned the UK legal report on 
the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, Mercouris was cited as “a 
practicing lawyer for 12 years at the Royal Courts of Justice” 
(Bridge, 2016).
The biography is true as far as it goes: Mercouris is known to 
have worked in the Royal Courts of Justice for twelve years, 
before becoming a barrister in 2006. However, he was reported 
as struck off from his post in 2012 after a case in which he 
reportedly confessed to having defrauded a client, faked one 
High Court judge’s signature and falsely accused another of a 
plot to kidnap and intimidate him (Wardrop, 2012). 
The first question is therefore whether Mercouris can be viewed 
as a credible authority on either legal or foreign affairs. 
It is, of course, a logical editorial decision to ask a lawyer for 
their opinion on an issue of law. For example, when the BBC 
reported on the launch of the inquiry in 2014, it quoted the UK’s 
former director of public prosecutions, Lord Ken Macdonald QC, 
as part of its coverage. 
However, Macdonald stepped down from his post as director 
of public prosecutions to return to work as a barrister, and 
subsequently held a string of high-profile appointments, 
including heading a government review of counter-terrorism 
policy in 2011. By contrast, Mercouris was expelled from the 
legal profession in disgrace and is not known to have worked 
in it since. While he can be assumed to have expertise in the 
inner workings of the UK legal system, he can hardly be viewed 
as a disinterested and impartial commentator on the institution 
which expelled him. 
RT’s regular reference to Mercouris on other issues of foreign 
policy is more curious. According to his published biography, 
Mercouris spent some 18 years at the Royal Courts of Justice 
in a variety of roles. There is no indication that he worked part-
time; it therefore appears unlikely that he could have developed 
in-depth expertise in foreign policy during the same period. 
Since he was struck off, he could, indeed, have begun a new 
career as a foreign-affairs analyst. However, his official biography 
on the Russia Insider website makes no mention of any foreign-
affairs qualification, research or experience, other than his legal 
background: “Alexander is a writer on international affairs with 
a special interest in Russia and law.  He has written extensively 
on the legal aspects of NSA spying and events in Ukraine in 
terms of human rights, constitutionality and international law. 
He worked for 12 years in the Royal Courts of Justice in London 
as a lawyer, specializing in human rights and constitutional law.”
According to this biography, his areas of expertise are Russia 
and the law. As such, there is nothing to indicate that he has 
in-depth expert knowledge of issues such as Dutch voting 
preferences, German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s diplomatic 
standing or the practices of European mainstream media. There 
is, therefore, no reason to consider him a credible expert in these 
fields - yet these are issues on which he has commented for RT 
and Russia Insider. 
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The question then becomes whether RT could have chosen a more 
credible commentator by making a reasonable effort. Mercouris 
is, according to his profile on Russia Insider, resident in London. 
London is home to literally thousands of legal practices. It hosts 
the University of London, numerous foreign-policy think tanks 
and most of the world’s major broadcasters, and is a short train 
ride from the universities of Oxford and Cambridge. Therefore, 
it is legitimate to assume that an editor in London, or seeking 
a quote from London, could, if they chose to make the effort, 
find a practicing or honourably retired lawyer to comment on a 
legal matter, and a serving foreign-policy analyst from an active 
academic institution or think tank to comment on a foreign-
policy issue. 
By turning to Mercouris as its commentator, RT made the 
choice not to refer to a more credible source. As such, it can be 
considered to have committed disinformation by publishing a 
polemic statement from a commentator whose impartiality and 
expertise are open to question. 
Conclusion 
Disinformation is easy to define, but difficult to prove 
conclusively. Yet there is a pressing need to improve the way 
by which the Western public and institutions can identify it in 
a timely manner. 
The ABC paradigm answers this need by identifying indicators 
which can be used to infer the probable presence, or absence, 
of the intent to disinform. Where such cases are identified, it 
is sufficient to ask whether the speaker could have avoided 
the violation by taking reasonable care in checking their facts, 
finding balancing quotes or seeking out a credible commentator. 
Care and judgement must be exercised in the use of this ABC 
paradigm: mistakes do happen, editors make errors of judgement 
and politicians fumble their lines. However, these errors can be 
corrected, and indeed should be corrected. If a speaker or a 
news outlet violates the ABC principles repeatedly, and does not 
correct their errors, they should be considered as committing 
disinformation. 
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